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Productivity Differences
Abstract
Many technologies used by the LDCs are developed in the OECD economies and are designed to make
optimal use of the skills of these richer countries' workforces. Differences in the supply of skills create a
mismatch between the requirements of these technologies and the skills of LDC workers, and lead to
low productivity in the LDCs. Even when all countries have equal access to new technologies, this
technology-skill mismatch can lead to sizable differences in total factor productivity and output per
worker. We provide evidence in favor of the cross-industry productivity patterns predicted by our
model, and also show that technology-skill mismatch could account for a large fraction of the observed
output per worker differences in the data.
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I. Introduction
What accounts for the large disparities in per capita income across countries? Many
economists believe that diﬀerences in technological knowledge are the main source of these
income diﬀerences (e.g., Romer [1993] or Prescott [1998]). This view receives support
from a number of recent studies that find significant “total factor productivity” (TFP)
diﬀerences across countries (e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez [1997], Caselli et al. [1997],
and Hall and Jones [1999]). Large cross-country diﬀerences in technology are diﬃcult
to understand, however. Ideas, perhaps the most important ingredient of technologies,
can rapidly flow across countries, and machines that embed better technologies can be
imported by less developed countries (LDCs).
In this paper, we argue that even when all countries have access to the same set
of technologies, there will be large cross-country productivity diﬀerences. Many tech-
nologies used by the LDCs (the South) are imported from more advanced countries (the
North).1 These technologies are designed to make optimal use of the prevailing factors
and conditions in these richer countries because lack of intellectual property rights and
other barriers to technology transfer induce R&D firms to target their innovations towards
the needs of the North. The center-piece of our argument is that because of diﬀerences in
economic conditions and factor prices, these technologies will often be inappropriate for
LDCs. Although there are many dimensions in which technological needs of the South
diﬀer from those of the North, including climate, geography, and culture, we focus on
diﬀerences in skill scarcity, which we believe to be important in practice. The North is
more abundant in skills and tends to develop relatively skill-complementary (skill-biased)
technologies. For example, in the United States, over 13 percent of all company funded
R&D in 1987 was for oﬃce computing, the prototypical example of skill-complementary
technology (NSF R&D Industry Detailed Statistical Tables). More generally, in the rich-
est countries, new technologies in most industries appear to be substituting skilled workers
for tasks previously performed by the unskilled (e.g. Katz and Murphy [1992]; Berman,
Bound and Machin [1998]), and are therefore of only limited use to the skill-scarce LDCs.
The main result of our paper is that this technology-skill mismatch will lead to
productivity diﬀerences and to large output gaps between the North and the LDCs even
in the absence of any barriers to technology transfer. LDCs must use unskilled workers
in tasks performed by skilled workers in the North. But technologies in these tasks have
been designed to be operated by skilled workers, and their productivity will be low when
operated by unskilled workers.
1Over 90 percent of the R&D expenditure in the world is carried on in the OECD, and over 35 percent
is in the U.S. (Authors’ calculation from UNESCO [1997]).
The contrast in the experiences of Japan and India in the production of diesel en-
gines illustrates some of the salient issues faced by skill-scarce LDCs in using imported
technologies. During the early 1960s, Cummins Engine Co., a U.S. technological leader,
formed a joint venture with a Japanese company, Komatsu, and also, a partnership with
an Indian company, Kirloskar, to produce the same truck engine. While the Japanese
plant quickly reached the U.S. quality and cost levels, in the Indian plant productivity
and quality were low, and costs were 3.5 to 4.1 times higher than U.S. costs. The rea-
son appears to be that, in contrast to the Japanese, the Indian workers did not possess
the “high degree of technical skill...required to convert techniques and produce the new
technical drawings and manufacturing specifications.” (Baranson [1972], pp. 58-59, and
[1967], pp. 80-81). This case illustrates how technology-skill mismatch can lead to sig-
nificant productivity diﬀerences even when LDCs have access to all the technologies used
in the North. Companies that invest in LDCs are often aware of these problems. After
interviewing managers of multinational corporations investing in LDCs in textiles, gar-
ments, plastics, and electronics, (Chen [1983], pp. 118-119) argues that multinationals
very often decide not to introduce advanced technologies in their overseas subsidiaries
because of skill shortages in these markets.2
Whether technology-skill mismatch can account for a substantial fraction of the cross-
country productivity diﬀerences is an empirical question. We perform two exercises to
evaluate the empirical importance of technology-skill mismatch. First, we test the im-
plications of our model regarding cross-country diﬀerences in sectoral productivity. We
construct measures of industry TFPs for 27 three-digit manufacturing industries in 22
countries using United Nations (U.N.) data. A naive intuition based on the notion of
technology diﬀerences would suggest that TFP gaps between the United States and LDCs
should be largest in the skill-intensive sectors which tend to be the more high technology
sectors. In contrast, our model predicts that these gaps should be largest in the least
skill-intensive sectors. This is because LDCs have access to the same set of technolo-
gies and are relatively scarce in skilled workers, so their prices and value of production
2Baranson [1969] reports that problems associated with mismatch between skills and technologies are
especially severe in the auto industry. According to Volkswagen managers, “engineers from developing
countries often lack the necessary practical experience to take over plant responsibilities... Typically,
there was an inadequate supply of the 20 to 30 middle managers, technical supervisors, and master
mechanics necessary to set up initial procedures...” (p. 27).
Other examples of technology-skill mismatch include the choice of maize grinding technique in Kenya
and choice of techniques for can making in Kenya, Tanzania and Thailand. Stewart [1977], chapter 9,
reports that despite its greater eﬃciency, the roller mill was rarely adopted in Kenya, and most producers
used the less productive hammer mill. Cooper et al [1975] point out that in many instances manual
production was used in can making despite the presence of continuous automatic machines. Part of the
reason in both cases was the skill demands of the more advanced technologies, in both operation and
repair.
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in the skill-intensive sectors will be relatively high.3 This is the pattern we find in the
data. For example, average TFP in LDCs is 22 percent of the U.S. level in the 9 least
skill-intensive sectors, whereas the same number is 30 percent in the 9 most skill-intensive
sectors. Interestingly, we do not find the same pattern when comparing industry TFPs
between the United States and other rich economies, which is consistent with our theory.
As a second exercise to evaluate the importance of technology-skill mismatch, we
undertake a simple calibration of our model using measures of cross-country diﬀerences
in skill supplies. This exercise suggests that the diﬀerences predicted by our model are
sizeable, and significantly larger than those predicted by a simple “neoclassical” model.
For example, using cross-country variation in physical capital and secondary school at-
tainment, the neoclassical model predicts that average output per worker in the LDCs
should be approximately 41 percent of the United States while our model predicts the
same number to be 27 percent, substantially closer to the 21 percent number we observe in
the data. Moreover, our calculations suggest that if technologies were not biased towards
the needs of the rich economies, output per worker diﬀerences would be much smaller.
A number of other papers have emphasized the diﬃculties in adapting advanced tech-
nologies to the needs of LDCs. Evanson andWestphal [1995] suggest that new technologies
require a large amount of tacit knowledge, which slows down the process of technological
convergence. The importance of “appropriateness” of technology has also received some
attention, for example from Salter [1969], Atkinson and Stiglitz [1969], David [1974], and
Stewart [1978]. An important recent contribution is Basu and Weil [1998]. They adopt
the formulation of Atkinson and Stiglitz where technological change takes the form of
learning-by-doing and influences productivity at the capital labor ratio currently in use.
Our paper diﬀers from Basu and Weil and the rest of the appropriate technology litera-
ture in a number of ways. First, what matters in our theory is not capital-labor ratios
(as in Atkinson and Stiglitz and Basu and Weil) or size of plants (as in Stewart), but
relative supplies of skills, which we believe to be more important in practice. Second, our
results do not follow because productivity depends on the exact capital-labor or skilled-
unskilled labor ratios in use, but because unskilled workers in the South perform some of
the tasks performed by skilled worker in the North. Third, and perhaps most important,
technological change is not an unintentional by-product of production, but a purposeful
activity. In particular, R&D firms in the North direct their innovations towards diﬀerent
technologies depending on relative profitability. All our results originate from the fact
that the relative abundance of skills in the North induces “skill-biased” innovations. In
this respect, our model is closely related to Acemoglu [1998] who models directed techni-
3This prediction would follow from other multisector-multiskill models in which diﬀerent countries
have access to the same set of technologies. We are not aware of any other papers that derive this
prediction.
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cal change, but focuses on its implications for wage inequality. A number of other papers,
including Mankiw, Romer and Weil [1992], Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan [1997] and Par-
ente, Rogerson and Wright [1998], try to explain cross-country income diﬀerences without
technology diﬀerences, but do not feature the technology skill-mismatch emphasized in
this paper. Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on innovation, imitation,
trade and technology transfer, for example, Vernon [1966], Krugman [1979], Grossman
and Helpman [1991], Rivera-Batiz and Romer [1991], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1997],
Eaton and Kortum [1999] and Zeira [1999].
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces our basic model. It shows
that productivity is higher in the North than in the South, and derives implications re-
garding cross-industry productivity diﬀerences between rich and poor economies. Section
III shows that cross-country industry TFP patterns conform with the predictions of our
model. In this section, we also perform a simple calibration to evaluate the potential
contribution of technology-skill mismatch to diﬀerences in output per worker. Section
IV discusses a number of extensions. We first analyze technical change and productivity
diﬀerences in a world with commodity trade. We show that international trade reduces
productivity diﬀerences, but at the same time causes divergence in output per worker. We
also discuss the predictions of the model when intellectual property rights are enforced in
the South and when Southern firms have access to less-skill intensive local technologies.
Section V concludes.
II. The Basic Model
A. The Environment
We consider a world economy consisting of a large advanced country, which we call
the North, and a set of small less developed countries which we refer to as the South. To
simplify the analysis, we assume all Southern countries to be identical. What distinguishes
the North and the South, other than their relative sizes, is the abundance of skills. The
North has Hn skilled and Ln unskilled workers, while the South has Hs skilled and Ls
unskilled workers. We assume that Hn/Ln > Hs/Ls, so the North is more abundant in
skills. As we will see shortly, all technological progress will originate in the North. But
the South can also adopt these technologies.
All countries admit a representative consumer with Constant Relative Risk Aversion
preferences
∞Z
t
C(τ)1−σ − 1
1− σ · exp(−ρ(τ − t)) · dτ ,
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at time t, where C(τ) is consumption at time τ and ρ is the discount rate. We suppress
time and country indexes when this causes no confusion.
The production technology is common across countries. Consumption and investment
come out of a Cobb-Douglas output aggregate,
C + I +X ≤ Y ≡ exp
·Z 1
0
ln y(i)di
¸
, (1)
where I is investment in machines, X is expenditure on R&D, and y (i) denotes output
in sector i. We normalize the price of the consumption aggregate in each period to 1.
Each final good can be produced by two technologies. The first uses unskilled labor
(l) and a set of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods (“machines”), whereas the second uses
skilled labor (h) and a diﬀerent a set of machines. The key assumption is that some
machines can only be used by unskilled workers, while some other machines can only be
used by skilled workers. This assumption captures the fact that the relative productivity
of technologies diﬀer by worker skill. More formally, good i is produced as;
y(i) =
"Z NL
0
kL(i, v)
1−βdv
#
· [(1− i) · l(i)]β +
"Z NH
0
kH(i, v)
1−βdv
#
· [i · Z · h(i)]β , (2)
where kz(i, v) is the quantity of machines of variety v used in sector i together with workers
of skill level z. The terms (1−i) and Z ·i denote exogenous sector- and technology-specific
productivity levels. This implies that the skilled technology is relatively more productive
in producing goods with higher indexes. The parameter Z ≥ 1 measures the relative
productivity of skilled workers. NL and NH are the number (measure) of machines that
can be used with unskilled and skilled workers.
Producers of the final good i ∈ [0, 1] are price takers. They maximize profits,
p (i) y (i)− wLl (i)− wHh (i)−
Z NL
0
χL (v) kL(i, v)dv −
Z NH
0
χH (v) kH(i, v)dv,
taking the prices of their products, p(i), wages, wL and wH , and the rental prices of all
machines, χL(v) and χH(v), as given. This maximization gives the following sectoral
demands for machines;
kL(i, v) =
h
(1− β) · p(i) · ((1− i) · l(i))β /χL(v)
i1/β
,
kH(i, v) =
h
(1− β) · p(i) · (i · Z · h(i))β /χH(v)
i1/β
. (3)
Intuitively, firms demand more machines when their product prices, p (i), are higher,
when machine prices, χL(v) and χH(v), are lower, and when their employment, l (i) or
h (i), are greater. This latter feature leads to a market size eﬀect; there will be a greater
demand for technologies complementing the factor that is more abundant.
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Each type of machine is produced by the monopolist who owns the patent for that va-
riety. For simplicity, we assume that machines depreciate instantaneously (see Acemoglu
and Zilibotti [1999] for the case of slow depreciation). We also assume the marginal cost
for the production of any machine is constant and equal to θ units of the final good. So a
monopolist producing a machine for sector z will set the machine price so as to maximize
its profits,
πz (ν) = (χ (ν)− θ)
Z 1
0
kz(i, ν)di, (4)
subject to the demand equations given in (3). Since (3) define isoelastic demands with
elasticity β, the profit maximizing price is χz(ν) = θ/(1 − β) = χ. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the marginal cost of machine production to θ ≡ δβ/(1−β)(1− β)2,
so that χ = δβ/(1−β) (1− β). The parameter δ diﬀers across countries and captures cross-
country diﬀerences in the price of capital. We normalize δ = 1 in the North, and presume
that typically δ ≥ 1 in the South (see, e.g., Jones [1995]). Although all our qualitative
conclusions hold if machine prices are identical in the South and the North, i.e., δ = 1 in
all countries, we allow machine prices to be greater in the South to facilitate the analysis
in the quantitative section.
Substituting machine prices into (3), and then using the resulting expressions with
(2), we obtain output in sector i as
y(i) = δ−1 · p(i)(1−β)/β · [NL · (1− i) · l(i) +NH · i · Z · h(i)] .
Increases in NH improve the productivity of skilled workers in all sectors, while increases
in NL improve the productivity of unskilled workers. The ratio NH/NL determines the
relative productivity of skilled and unskilled technologies, and will be the measure of
skill-bias in the economy.
Technical progress takes the form of increases over time in NL and NH . This is
similar to the expanding variety model of Romer [1990] and Grossman and Helpman
[1991], but allows for technical change to be skill-or labor-complementary as in Acemoglu
[1998]. In particular, new labor-complementary (complementary to unskilled workers) or
skill—complementary machines are invented as a result of R&D. Most important, techni-
cal change is directed ; the degree to which new technologies are skill-complementary is
endogenous (see Acemoglu [1998]). New technologies are developed using final output. In
particular, the R&D to invent a new variety of either type of machine costs µ. A firm that
invents a machine obtains an indefinite patent to produce it. This specification implies
that with a total expenditure of X, there will be X/µ new varieties invented. Therefore,
the law of motion of Nz is given by
N˙z =
Xz
µ
,
6
where Xz denotes total output devoted to improving the technology of group z = L or H.
B. Analysis
We now characterize the equilibrium in the North and the South for a given state of
technology, NL and NH . Both the North and the South have access to this technology.
We assume for now that there is no international trade, and continue to omit country
indices.
The pattern of comparative advantage embedded in the production function (2)
makes skilled workers relatively more productive in high indexed goods. Using this fact,
it is straightforward to prove that there will exist a threshold sector J ∈ [0, 1] such that
only unskilled workers will be used to produce goods with i ≤ J (i.e., h(i) = 0 for all
i ≤ J), and only skilled workers will be used to produce goods with i ≥ J (i.e., l(i) = 0
for all i ≥ J) (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1999] for a formal proof).
We can then write the production of good i as
y(i) =
(
δ−1 · p(i)(1−β)/β · (1− i) ·NL · l(i) if 0 ≤ i ≤ J
δ−1 · p(i)(1−β)/β · i ·NH · Z · h(i) if J < i ≤ 1 . (5)
In equilibrium, the marginal value product of unskilled workers, δ−1 · p(i)1/β · (1− i) ·NL,
has to be equalized across all sectors i ≤ J . Similarly, the marginal value product of
skilled workers, δ−1 · p(i)1/β · i ·NH · Z, also has to be equalized across all sectors i ≥ J .
Moreover, the Cobb-Douglas structure in (1) implies that expenditures across goods are
equalized, i.e., p (i) y (i) is constant for all i. Combining these two observations with
market clearing,
R J
0 l(i)di = L and
R 1
J h(i)di = H, we obtain
4
for any i ≤ J , p(i) = PL · (1− i)−βand l(i) = L/J , and (6)
for any i ≥ J , p(i) = PH · i−βand h(i) = H/(1− J), (7)
where PL = p (0) and PH = p (1) are two price indices to be determined. Notice that
goods with higher indexes produced with unskilled labor have a less productive technology
and command higher prices. The converse is true for skilled goods.
To fully characterize the equilibrium, we need to find the threshold sector J . This
can be done by noting that in sector J both a firm that uses unskilled workers and a firm
that uses skilled workers should breakeven. In other words, both equations (6) and (7)
4For the marginal value product to be the same for all i ∈ [0, J ], p(i)1/β · (1− i) has to be constant.
Define this constant as PL. Then, p(i) = PL ·(1−i)−β. Substituting this into (5) and using p(i)y (i) = cst,
we find that l (i) has to be constant, hence l (i) = L/J . The argument for the skill-intensive sectors is
identical.
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should hold for i = J, implying that
PH
PL
=
µ
J
1− J
¶β
. (8)
Moreover, since p (i) y (i) is constant for all i, PH y(1) = PL y (0). Therefore, using (5)
and (8), we obtain
J =
1 + µNH
NL
ZH
L
¶ 1
2
−1 . (9)
This equation shows that either if the technology is highly skill-biased (high NH/NL) or
if there is a large relative supply of skilled workers (high H/L), the fraction of sectors
employing skilled workers and using the skilled technology will be large–i.e., J will be
small). In this case, equation (8) implies that the relative price of skill intensive goods
will also be low.
Also, using the fact that exp
hR 1
0 ln p(i)di
i
= 1, we find the price indices to be
PL = exp(−β) ·
1 + µNH
NL
ZH
L
¶ 1
2
β and PH = exp(−β) ·
1 + µNH
NL
ZH
L
¶− 1
2
β . (10)
So the prices of labor-intensive goods are higher (and the prices of skill-intensive goods
are lower) when the relative supply of skill-intensive goods is larger–i.e., when technology
is more skill-biased and when there is a large relative supply of skilled workers.
Next, since factor markets are competitive, the relative wage of skilled workers is
wH
wL
= Z
µ
NH
NL
¶1/2 µZH
L
¶−1/2
. (11)
Therefore, the skill premium is greater when technologies are more skill-biased and when
skilled workers are relatively more scarce. Finally, combining the definition Y =
R 1
0 p(i)y(i)di
with (5), (8), (9), and (10) gives
Y = exp(−1) · δ−1 ·
h
(NLL)
1/2 + (NHZH)
1/2
i2
. (12)
This simple representation of the aggregate technology, which features constant elasticity
of substitution between two types of labor, will be useful in the analysis of productivity
diﬀerences between the North and the South.
As we will see in more detail below, the state of technology, NH/NL, is the same in
both the North and the South, but the relative supply of skills is lower in the South, i.e.,
Hs/Ls < Hn/Ln. This leads to a number of immediate implications. First, there will
be more sectors using unskilled workers and unskilled technologies in the South (J s >
Jn). Second, the relative prices of skill intensive goods will be higher in the South, i.e.,
P sH/P
s
L > P
n
H/P
n
L . In fact, from (10), we have P
s
H > P
n
H and P
s
L < P
n
L . Finally, the skill
premium, wH/wL, will be higher in the South.
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C. Technological Progress
We now characterize the evolution of the state of technology, and the degree of skill-
bias, NH/NL. We will show that in equilibrium there will only be innovations in the
North, while producers in the South will copy the technologies developed in the North.
Suppose that intellectual property rights are not enforced internationally. Recall
also that there is no international trade. In the absence of international property rights
intermediate producers located in one country cannot sell their machines (or copyrights)
to firms located in the other countries, so the relevant market for technologies is the
local market. Since the R&D technology specified above entails a market size eﬀect, this
implies that the share of GDP spent by each economy on R&D will be an increasing
function of the local market size, Lc + ZHc (see below). Because the South consists of
a set of “small” economies, intermediate firms will have an infinitesimal market, and the
South, collectively, will not invest in R&D. Southern producers will instead copy all their
technologies from the North. Although the market size eﬀect in our model conveniently
rules out R&D in the South, we believe that lack of property rights and other distortions
are more important in practice in limiting R&D in LDCs. Furthermore, if R&D is skill-
intensive, then the scarcity of skills will also reduce R&D in LDCs. Our assumption that
each Southern country is small captures these considerations in a simple way.
We assume that new technologies developed in the North can be copied and adapted
in each Southern economy at some small cost ε. The fact that ε > 0 implies that once a
firm adapts a new technology, it is not profitable for any others to do so because this would
lead to Bertrand competition and negative net profits. Hence, all machines invented in
the North will immediately be copied in the South, and supplied to producers by a (local)
monopolist. This monopolist also faces isoelastic demands given by (3) and will therefore
set the profit maximizing price, χ = δβ/(1−β) (1− β).5 Therefore, firms in the South will
have access to exactly the same set of technologies, NL and NH , as in the North.
Since the South performs no R&D, the evolution of NL and NH only depends on
the returns to innovation in the North. We denote the value of a monopolist producing
machine v complementary to workers of skill type z at time t by V nz (v, t), where the
superscript n denotes “the North”. Symmetry across machines implies that V nz (v, t) =
V nz (t) for all v, so all machines produced for skill type z are equally profitable. In
particular;
V nz (t) =
Z ∞
t
exp
·
−
Z τ
t
r(ω)dω
¸
πnz (τ )dτ (13)
5The implicit assumption is that a local firm will be the first one to adapt the new technology to the
local market. If the original inventor were to be the first, it could make additional profits from sales in
the South.
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where r(τ ) is the interest rate at date τ , and
πnL(τ ) = (χ
n − θ)
Z Jn
0
knL(i)di = β(1− β) (PnL (τ))1/β Ln, and (14)
πnH(τ ) = (χ
n − θ)
Z 1
Jn
knH(i)di = β(1− β) (PnH(τ))1/β ZHn
are the flow profits. The expressions in (14) are obtained using (3), (6), (7), and the fact
that χn ≡ (1 − β) (as δ = 1 in the North). Since monopolists can only sell machines
to Northern producers employing Northern workers, Ln and Hn are the markets for new
technologies (machines).
Free-entry implies that the value of a monopolist cannot exceed the cost of innovation,
µ. Thus, V nz (t) ≤ µ for all t. Whenever V nz (t) < µ, there will be no R&D activity to
create new z-complementary machines.6
Along the Balanced Growth Path (BGP), NL and NH must grow at the same rate.
Since there is only research in the North, this implies that Northern firms must devote
the same relative research expenditure to skill- and labor-complementary innovations, i.e.,
XnL/NL = X
n
H/NH . This is only possible if V
n
L = V
n
H = µ which, in turn, implies that
the flow profits from selling labor-and skill-complementary machines should be equal, i.e.,
πnL = π
n
H . Hence, in the BGP, we need
PnH
PnL
=
µ
ZHn
Ln
¶−β
. (15)
Intuitively, when there are more skilled workers, the market for skill-complementary ma-
chines is larger, and so the relative price of skill-intensive goods has to be lower to ensure
πnL = π
n
H . Using (6), (7), and (9), we obtain:
NH
NL
=
1− Jn
Jn
=
ZHn
Ln
. (16)
This equation defines the relative productivity of skilled and unskilled workers along the
BGP as a function of the relative supply of skilled workers in the North. It also determines
the threshold sector Jn along the BGP. The reason whyNH/NL is increasing inH/L is the
market size eﬀect: it is more profitable to invent technologies that have greater clienteles,
and when there are more skilled workers, skill-complementary technologies have a greater
market.
The next proposition summarizes this result and the dynamics of the economy outside
the BGP both in the North and in the South (proof in Appendix A).
6Notice at this point that in the South there will be no R&D; since Ls and Hs are small, πsz is small,
so V sz < µ.
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Proposition 1 There exists a unique and globally (saddle path) stable BGP, given by
equations (6), (7), (8), (9), and (16). Along this growth path, GDP, consumption, NL
and NH grow at the rate
g =
1
σ
·
h
exp(−1) · β · (1− β) · µ−1 · (Ln + ZHn)− ρ
i
. (17)
There is a unique BGP, and starting from any NL and NH , the economy converges to
this BGP. Since both NL and NH grow at the common rate g, the relative productivities
of skilled and unskilled workers are constant. Relative productivities can change along
the transition path, however. As in Acemoglu [1998], an increase in Hn/Ln leads to
skill-biased technical change, that is an increase in Hn/Ln raises NH/NL. Interestingly,
the skill premium in the North is always wnH/w
n
L = Z. Skill-biased technical change
induced by an increase in Hn/Ln therefore exactly cancels the negative direct impact of
this variable on relative wages (see equations (11) and (16)).
Finally, both net output, NY , and consumption, C, are maximized in the BGP,
because the equilibrium skill-bias, NH/NL, is chosen “appropriately” for the North’s skill
composition (proof omitted):
Corollary 1 Let NY ≡ Y −X and C = Y − I −X. Then, the BGP value of NH/NL,
given by equation (16), maximizes NY and C in the North.
In contrast, since factor abundance in the South does not aﬀect the direction of
technical change, new technologies developed by the North are inappropriate for the
needs of the South. In particular, net output and consumption in the world economy,
NY w ≡ Y n + Y s − Xn and Cw ≡ Y n + Y s − In − Is − Xn, are not maximized by the
technology choices in the North (i.e., by NH/NL as given by (16)).
D. Productivity Diﬀerences Between the North and the South
In this subsection, we describe the main theoretical results that will be tested in the
next section. We derive two sets of predictions. The first concerns the pattern of cross-
industry TFP diﬀerences between rich and poor economies. Our model predicts that
sectoral TFPs should be larger in the North relative to the South in the labor-intensive
rather than in skill-intensive sectors. The second concerns aggregate productivity. We
will show that even though the South has access to the same technological opportunities
as the North, aggregate productivity (as measured by either output per worker or TFP)
should be higher in the North than in the South.
To analyze cross-industry TFP diﬀerences, we decompose the value added of each
industry, obtained by multiplying (5) with prices, into three components; capital input,
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labor input and TFP. More formally;
pc(i) · ycL(i) = acL (i) ·KcL(i)1−β · lc(i)β, (18)
pc(i) · ycH(i) = acH (i) ·KcH(i)1−β · [Z · hc(i)]β ,
where c ∈ {n, s} is the country index, Kcz(i) ≡
RNz
0 k
c
z(i, v) dv is the capital input of
industry i, and acL(i) ≡ pc(i) · [(1− i) ·NL]β and acH (i) ≡ pc(i) · [i ·NH ]β are sectoral
(industry) TFPs. Using equations (6) and (7), we obtain;
acL(i) = a
c
L = P
c
LN
β
L , (19)
acH (i) = a
c
H = P
c
HN
β
H .
Next, recall that, in a BGP, P nH/P
n
L = (NH/NL)
−β (see equations (15) and (16)). So, along
the BGP, all sectors in the North have the same TFP, i.e., anL = a
n
H ≡ an.7 Also from
equation (10), P sH > P
n
H and P
s
L < P
n
L , which reflects the relative scarcity of skills in the
South. Therefore, (19) implies that TFP will be larger in the North in the sectors that use
unskilled technologies in the South, and will be larger in the South in the sectors that use
skilled technologies in the South. This result is represented in Figure 1 diagrammatically
and summarized in the following Proposition (proof omitted).
Proposition 2 Hs/Ls < Hn/Ln implies that asH(i ≥ Js) > an > asL(i ≤ J s).
This prediction is driven by the pattern of relative prices in the two countries. In
the South, skilled labor is scarce, so skill-intensive goods are more expensive, leading to
greater TFPs in these sectors.
We next turn to the analysis of aggregate productivity diﬀerences. First, define
“physical productivity” in sector i as acz (i) /p
c (i). From our previous analysis;
acz (i)
pc (i)
=
(
((1− i)NL)β if i ≤ Jc
(iNH)
β if i ≥ Jc .
This expression shows that physical productivities are the same in the North and the South
in all sectors where firms in the two countries adopt the same technology. In particular,
in sectors i ≤ Jn as well as i ≥ Js. However, physical productivity is higher in the North
in sectors i ∈ [Jn, J s], where the South uses unskilled workers and the labor-intensive
technology, while the North uses skilled workers and the skill-intensive technology. Figure
2 plots the physical productivities, az(i)/p(i), in each of the two technologies. Note that
the two schedules cross at Jn ≡ NL/(NL + NH) (as given by the BGP condition (16)).
This implies that physical productivity is higher in the skilled technology in all sectors
7Specifically, using equations (9), (10), (16) and (19), we obtain an = exp (−β) · (NL +NH)β.
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j > Jn, exactly as in the North. This is because R&D is directed at the North’s needs.
Since Hs/Ls < Hn/Ln, however, we have Js > Jn, and physical productivity is lower in
the South than in the North in some sectors.
This result can be translated into a measure of aggregate TFP. Write total output
as:
Y c = exp
ÃZ Jc
0
ln ycL(i) di+
Z 1
Jc
ln ycH(i) di
!
= A(Jc,NL,NH)·
³
K1−βL l
β
´J ³
K1−βH (Zh)
β
´1−J
,
(20)
whereA(J,NL, NH) ≡ exp
³R J
0 ln (aL(i)/p(i)) di+
R 1
J ln (aH(i)/p(i)) di
´
is aggregate TFP,
obtained from separating the terms with factor content from the technology terms.8 Since,
in a BGP, physical productivities are the same in all sectors, except in i ∈ [Jn, Js] where
the North has higher productivity than the South, aggregate TFP is higher in the North
than in the South.
It is important to note that in this economy all countries have access to the same
aggregate production possibilities frontier. So one might conjecture that there should
be no aggregate TFP diﬀerences across countries (though cross-sectoral TFP diﬀerences
should continue to exist). However, since countries with diﬀerent factor endowments will
choose diﬀerent points along the aggregate production possibilities frontier, the measures
employed in practice and even our theoretical measure, A (J,NL,NH), will lead to aggre-
gate TFP diﬀerences. Given these issues, it is perhaps more transparent to look at simpler
measures of aggregate productivity; output per worker, yc, and output per eﬃciency unit
of labor, yeff,c,
yc(Hc, Lc,NL,NH | δ) ≡ Y
c
Lc +Hc
= exp(−1) · δ−1 ·
h
(NLL
c)1/2 + (NHZH
c)1/2
i2
Lc +Hc
.
yeff,c(Hc, Lc, NL, NH | δ) ≡ Y
c
Lc + ZHc
= exp(−1) · δ−1 ·
h
(NLL
c)1/2 + (NHZH
c)1/2
i2
Lc + ZHc
.
In writing these expressions, we condition on δ because this variable determines the equi-
librium capital labor ratio. Diﬀerentiation establishes that givenNH/NL, yeff(H,L,NL, NH |
δ) is an inverse U-shaped function of H/L with a maximum at H/L = NH/NL, whereas
y(H,L,NL, NH | δ) is an inverse U-shaped function of H/L with a maximum at H/L =
ZNH/NL. These observations immediately establish (proof omitted):
Proposition 3 Assume that NH/NL is given as in (16), then:
1. For any H/L 6= Hn/Ln, we have yeff(Hn, Ln, NL, NH | δ) > yeff(H,L,NL, NH | δ).
8To obtain the expression for A (J,NL, NH), use
R 1
0 ln p(i) di = 0.
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2. For any H/L < Hn/Ln, we have y(Hn, Ln,NL, NH | δ) > y(H,L,NL, NH | δ).
When NH/NL is chosen according to the North’s needs, both output per eﬃciency
unit of labor and output per worker are higher in the North than in the South. Output
per eﬃciency unit is in fact maximized in the North, whereas output per worker would
be maximized by a skill endowment larger than the relative skill endowment in the North
(recall that Z > 1). Furthermore, both yeff,n/yeff,s and yn/ys, productivity and output
per worker in the North relative to the South, are strictly increasing inNH/NL. Therefore,
as technologies become more skill-biased, the output gap (per worker or per eﬃciency unit
of labor) between the North and the South widens. These exercises compare two economies
with the same cost of capital δ. Since δ = 1 in the North and δ ≥ 1 in the South, we
have yeff(Hn, Ln,NL, NH | δ = 1) > yeff(Hs, Ls, NL, NH | δs) and y(Hn, Ln, NL, NH |
δ = 1) > y(Hs, Ls, NL, NH | δs) a fortiori when δs > 1.
The reason for the aggregate productivity diﬀerences between the North and the
South, measured in terms of TFP or output per worker, is technology-skill mismatch.
The North develops technologies that are most appropriate to its needs. In particular,
the North invests more in skill-biased technologies, NH , because there are relatively more
skilled workers using these technologies in the North. However, these Northern technolo-
gies are mismatched to the skills of the LDCs’ workforces. In our model, this is because
in sectors j ∈ [Jn, Js], production in the LDCs is carried out using unskilled workers, and
these workers use the unskilled technology, NL, rather than the skilled technology, and
are less productive as a result.
It is also important to note that if R&D firms could sell to Southern producers, they
would invest more in unskilled technologies (i.e., develop less skill-biased technologies),
and productivity in the South would not be as low. Similarly, if the South could perform
R&D, it would direct it to unskilled machines, and the productivity gap would be smaller.
It is therefore the combination of the South importing technologies from the North and
directed technical change in the North that leads to the productivity diﬀerences between
the North and the South.
III. Empirical Evidence and Quantitative Assessment
In this section, we test the prediction regarding sectoral TFPs, and investigate
whether the theoretical mechanism we developed could be quantitatively significant.
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A. Cross-country Patterns in Industry TFPs
We start by investigating some of the implications of Proposition 2. To do this,
we calculate sectoral TFPs using data from the U.N. General Industrial Statistics on
the number of production workers, number of nonproduction workers, employment, value
added and investment (converted into U.S. dollars) in 27 three digit manufacturing sectors
in 22 countries.9 From these data, we construct sectoral capital stocks and TFP for each
country. The construction of these variables is described in Appendix B. We use the
number of nonproduction workers as a proxy for high skill workers as in previous work in
this area (e.g. Berman, Bound and Griliches [1994]; Berman, Bound and Machin [1998]).
The data for employment and value added are for 1990, but since data on the number of
nonproduction workers is often missing for 1990, we use the average between 1986 and
1990 for all countries and sectors.
The first three rows of Table 1 report selected averages for these measures. With a
view to testing the predictions of our model, we rank sectors according to “skill-intensity”
in the United States defined as the ratio of nonproduction workers to total employment
in that industry. We then create three groups, low-skill, medium-skill, and high-skill,
each consisting of 9 industries (see Table 1). We report (weighted) average values of
value added per worker, capital per worker, and ratio of nonproduction workers in total
workforce for each group, separately for the LDCs and the “rich” economies (those with
GDP per capita greater than $6,500, see Table 1). Not surprisingly, value added and
capital per worker, and the ratio of nonproduction workers in the workforce are lower in
the LDCs than in the rich economies.10
Proposition 2 implies a strong and a weak hypothesis. The strong hypothesis is
that TFP in the South should be higher than in the North in the less skill intensive
industries and lower than in the North in the more skill intensive industries. The weak
hypothesis is that TFPs in the LDCs relative to the United States should be higher in the
skill intensive sectors. In the empirical work, we focus mainly on the weak hypothesis.
9Berman, Bound and Machin [1998] use this data set to analyze skill upgrading in advanced countries,
Berman and Machin [1999] use it to analyze inequality trends and skill upgrading in developing countries,
and Wolfson [1999] uses the related UNIDO dataset to analyze the factor content of trade between less
and more developed countries.
10The statistics reported in the first and second row of Table 1 imply somewhat lower capital-output
ratios than is commonly estimated in developed countries. This ratio is sensitive to the choice of the
depreciation rate for capital. Our choice of a depreciation rate of 8% implies an average lifetime of
capital of 12.5 years which is rather short. This choice is motivated by the constraint on the number
of observations for investment (see Appendix B), since a relatively high depreciation rate mitigates the
problems associated with the short sample. The capital-output ratio is the only measure which is sensitive
to this choice. We checked the robustness of our analysis by using a depreciation rate of 5% and also no
depreciation over the sample. In these cases, the capital output ratios were higher, but relative TFPs
and regression results were very similar to those reported here.
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First, the strong hypothesis requires technology-skill mismatch to be the only source
of productivity diﬀerences between the United States and the LDCs, which is clearly
unrealistic. Second, production-nonproduction distinction understates skill diﬀerences
across countries, leading to exaggerated TFP diﬀerences between the United States and
the LDCs in all sectors. For example, the ratio of workers with high school or more in
the labor force is 70 percent in the United States, whereas 15 percent in the set of LDCs
considered in this section (see next subsection for data details). In contrast, the ratio of
nonproduction workers in manufacturing is 33 percent in the United States vs. 23 percent
in this set of LDCs. This implies that both production and nonproduction workers in
the United States will be more educated, and hence more productive even when using
the same technologies, than production and nonproduction workers in LDCs. These
diﬀerences in productivity will be reflected in our TFP estimates, exaggerating the TFP
diﬀerences between the United States and the LDCs. So TFP will tend to be higher in
the United States than the LDCs in all sectors.11 In any case, we believe that the weak
hypothesis is a challenging test for our theory; this hypothesis contrasts with a naive
intuition that TFP diﬀerences should be largest in the most skill-intensive sectors, which
are often the most high-technology sectors.
It is important to note that in our database value added observations are computed
using local prices. Therefore, our sectoral TFP calculations will correspond to the theo-
retical TFP measure we discussed in the previous section, acz.
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We assume that output in sector i in country c is given by
yic = TFPic · Fi(kic, eic),
where e is eﬃciency units of labor and the production function Fi is constant returns the
scale. So all countries share the same technology in each industry, except for a multiplica-
tive TFP term. We calculate the eﬃciency units of labor as
eic = prodic + ζ · nonprodic,
where prodic is the number of production workers in country c and industry i, nonprodic
is the number of nonproduction workers in country c and industry i, and ζ is the eﬃciency
11We can get a sense of how large this measurement problem is by comparing aggregate manufacturing
TFP diﬀerences that are implied by our calculations in this subsection to the aggregate TFP diﬀerences
as calculated by Hall and Jones [1999]. The numbers here suggest that the LDCs in our sample have on
average TFP levels that are approximately 23 percent of the U.S. level. In contrast, the data reported
in Hall and Jones [1999] imply that the same set of countries should have TFP levels equivalent to 57
percent of the U.S. level, or approximately 2.5 larger than the LDC TFP levels implied by the U.N. data.
This substantiates the claim that the use of production-nonproduction classification will exaggerate TFP
diﬀerences between rich and poor countries.
12As discussed in the previous section, our theory also has implications on the cross-sectoral pattern
of diﬀerences in physical productivities, acz (i) /p (i). To test these implications, one would need sectoral
price indices that are comparable across countries in levels, which we do not have.
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units that a nonproduction worker possesses relative to a production worker. This corre-
sponds to Z in terms of our model, though in the equilibrium of our model skilled and
unskilled workers never work in the same industry. Berman, Bound and Machin [1998]
report the relative wage of nonproduction to production workers is approximately 1.5 in
the OECD economies, so we take this as our baseline case.13
We use three diﬀerent methods to calculate TFP. The first is a direct analog of the
TFP calculation over time applied across countries within an industry. We rank countries
in each industry according to capital labor ratios, and apply the standard TFP calculation
method (see Appendix B). We denote the output of this exercise by TFPCWic where i and
c refer to industry and country, CW refers to chain-weighted. The second method simply
assumes the production function, Fi, to be Cobb-Douglas, and uses average labor share
within each industry to calculate TFP. We refer to this measure as TFPCDic . Finally, the
third method constructs a TFP measure calculated as the residual from the regression;
ln ylic = υ
k
i ln k
l
ic + υ
e
i ln e
l
ic + bεic
where yl denotes value added per worker, kl capital per worker and el eﬃciency units
of labor per worker, and the coeﬃcients {υki , υei}27i=1 are estimated by OLS. We define
lnTFPRic = bεic and refer to this measure as “regression adjusted TFP”. This third method
may be biased as variations in capital and skill across industries are likely to be correlated
with the residuals. Nevertheless, this measure provides a check on whether our results
are driven by the functional form assumptions used in the construction of TFPCWic and
TFPCDic . In all cases, we normalize TFPiUS = 1, so all TFPs are relative to the United
States TFP in that sector.
Descriptive statistics for sectoral TFPs are given in the last three rows of Table 1
for the three industry groups and the three measures of TFP. In each case, we report
average TFPs relative to the United States. We weight observations using value added,
which amounts to giving more weight to larger sectors and larger countries.
We can already see the relevant patterns of industry TFPs from Table 1. First, TFP is
significantly higher in the North in all sectors. This might be because of diﬀerences in the
access to the most advanced technologies across countries, or because of the measurement
problems mentioned above. In any case, there is no support for the strong hypothesis
predicted by our theory. More important for our purposes, the data appear consistent
with our weak hypothesis. For example, using either TFPCW or TFPCD, TFP in the
LDCs is 22 percent of the United States in the low skill industries, 26-27 percent of the
United States in the medium skill industries, and 30 percent of the United States in the
13We also calculated TFP measures using ζ = 1.3 and 1.7. The results were very similar in all cases,
so we do not report those. Details are available upon request.
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high skill industries. Using regression adjusted TFP, the same numbers are 34 percent,
49 percent, and 64 percent. Therefore, with all three measures, TFP gaps are smaller
between the LDCs and the United States (and other rich economies) in the highest skill
sectors.14
We now use regression analysis to document the relationship between relative TFPs
and skill intensity more formally. Our baseline regressions relating TFPCWic to skill-
intensity in the United States are reported in Table 2 and support the basic conclusion
from Table 1 that TFP gaps are smaller between the LDCs and the United States in
the highest skill sectors. The estimates in Table 2 are obtained by regressing tfpCWic ≡
lnTFPCWic on the (log) ratio of nonproduction workers to total employment in that in-
dustry in the North, pn_North. We take the North to be either the United States or the
average of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada (the “G3”). All regres-
sions are weighted by value added and include country eﬀects, and the standard errors
are corrected for clustering of pn_North, which varies only at the industry level. The
corrected standard errors are typically about 70 percent larger than the regular standard
errors. The results show that the coeﬃcient on pn_North is positive when the sample
is limited to poor countries, but not when limited to rich countries, which is the predic-
tion of our model. For example, the estimate in column 1, which is from a regression
that uses the United States as the North, suggests that an industry with a 10 percent
higher ratio of nonproduction workers in total employment will have about 2.4 percent
higher TFP in the LDCs compared to the United States (relative to the average TFP in
that country). This eﬀect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level and also of a
plausible magnitude: pn_North (for the United States) varies between 0.13 and 0.51 in
the sample, so the result in column 1 implies that relative TFP in the LDCs is higher by
about 10 percent in the most skilled intensive industry than in the least skilled intensive
industry. India, one of our LDCs, is an outlier in the regression of column 1. There
is reason to believe in that data quality is lower for India as investment data for this
country were missing for a large number of years. We therefore repeat the regression
without including India in column 2. This leads to a greater parameter estimate, 0.36,
indicating that a 10 percent higher ratio of nonproduction workers in total employment
is associated with a 3.6 percent higher TFP in the LDCs compared to the United States.
14The 70 percent gap between the United States and LDC TFPs in the most skill-intensive industries
may suggest that technology-skill mismatch can explain only a small fraction of the productivity dif-
ferences across countries. However, recall that this 70 percent gap is in part due to the measurement
problems noted above. If we apply the 2.5 correction suggested by footnote ??, we would obtain that
TFP levels in the LDCs are 75 percent of the United States in the most skill-intensive industries and 55
percent in the least skill-intensive industries. This suggests that although there are other factors at work,
technology-skill match could be responsible for over one-third of TFP diﬀerences between the LDCs and
the U.S..
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This estimate is now significant at the 1 percent level. In column 3, we use the ratio of
nonproduction workers to total employment in the United States, the United Kingdom
and Canada instead. This leads to a parameter estimate of 0.31, which is again highly
significant. In contrast to these results for LDCs, we do not find a statistically significant
relationship between pn_North and industry TFPs among rich countries (columns 3 and
4).15
Figure 3 plots TFP (relative to the United States) for a number of the LDCs in
our sample against the rank of that industry in terms of skill intensity in the United
States (where rank=1 stands for the least skill-intensive industry). The curves represent
fitted log-regressions. Colombia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Turkey illustrate the
positive relationship shown in Table 2 (also found in Venezuela). India is one of the
three countries in which no significant relationship is found (the others are Indonesia and
Ecuador). Overall, as the last figure shows, there is a well-defined relationship when
we look at the average across all the LDCs. In a number of countries, miscellaneous
petroleum products (MISCPET) and beverages (BEV) appear as outliers.16 Excluding
these industries does not alter the main results reported in Table 2, but reduces the
point estimates; without these industries, the regression coeﬃcients in column 1, 2 and 3
decrease to 0.14 (s.e.=0.08), 0.23 (s.e.=0.09) and 0.22 (s.e.=0.11).
The regressions in columns 6, 7 and 8 use the sample of 21 countries (the entire sample
minus the United States since all numbers are relative to the United States), but add an
interaction term between the right hand side variable and the relative GDP of the country
in question. According to our theory, the relationship between TFP and skill intensity
should be stronger for poorer countries because PH/PL and aH/aL are increasing in the
skill-intensity gap between the country in question and the United States. The interaction
term in these regressions is parameterized so that the main eﬀects are evaluated at the
mean. Hence we expect both the interaction term and the main eﬀect to be positive, so
that TFP in the high skill industries (relative to the rest of the industries) in the average
country should be higher than in the United States, and the gap should become larger as
we consider poorer countries. The results in columns 6, 7 and 8 support this prediction.
The interaction term is always positive, and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Variations using diﬀerent measures of TFP or diﬀerent estimation methods are re-
15The results are robust to diﬀerent splits of the sample into rich countries and LDCs. For example, if
the threshold were set at $7,000 rather than $6,500, Greece, Portugal and Korea would also be classified
as LDCs. In this case, the estimates in columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 1 are, respectively, 0.14 (s.e.=0.07),
0.17 (s.e.=0.07) and 0.20 (s.e.=0.09), while the eﬀect remains negative and statistically insignificant for
rich countries.
16Scientific Equipment is also an outlier in the opposite direction. The large TFP gap between the
U.S. and the LDCs in this sector suggests that technological diﬀerences may be quite important in this
industry.
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ported in Table 3, and confirm the basic findings. We report estimates from regressions
that use the alternative measures, TFPCDic and TFP
R
ic , and from regressions weighted by
value added relative to the country average (value added relative to country average) or
weighted by employment. We also report specifications that use the rank of the industry
in terms of the corresponding skill-intensity measure, rank. All regressions in Table 3
include country eﬀects. In almost all cases, TFP gaps are larger in the sectors that are
less skill-intensive in the North (the United States or G3). Moreover in most cases, this
eﬀect is statistically significant, except when we weight observations by employment, the
relationship is typically statistically insignificant. Once again, when we remove India
from the sample, which plays a disproportionate role when observations are weighted by
employment, the eﬀects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Overall, we
take this as evidence that there is a relatively robust relationship between sectoral TFPs
in LDCs and skill intensity of the sector, consistent with the predictions of our theory.
B. Aggregate Productivity Diﬀerences
We now turn to an investigation of how important our mechanism may be in account-
ing for cross-country diﬀerences in output per worker. Although we do not think that our
mechanism accounts for all the variation in output per worker across countries, to perform
this exercise we abstract from all other sources of productivity diﬀerences. We therefore
view this exercise as providing an upper bound on how much of the cross-country produc-
tivity diﬀerences technology-skill mismatch could explain. More specifically, we compare
the predictive power of our model with that of a comparable neoclassical model, where
all countries have access to the same technology and output is Cobb-Douglas in human
and physical capital. According to the neoclassical formulation, country c’s output is;
Y cNC = Q · (Kc)α · (Lc + ZHc)1−α , (21)
where the technological parameter Q is the same across countries. This is eﬀectively the
model used, among many others, by Hall and Jones [1999], adapted to our environment
with two types of workers. We use Kc, Lc and Hc from the data, and set α = 0.33 (which
is equivalent to 1 − β in our model), since this is the share of capital in the model. Z
is chosen to match the relevant wage premium observed in the United States. Given
Kc, Lc,Hc, Z and α, we can calculate GDP per worker as predicted by the neoclassical
benchmark model, yˆcNC =
Y cNC
Lc+Hc
, and we choose Q to normalize yˆUSNC = 1.
In contrast, in our model output per worker, yˆcAZ , is:
yˆcAZ =
Y cAZ
Lc +Hc
= exp (−1) · (δ
c)−1 ·
h
(NLL
c)1/2 + (NHZH
c)1/2
i2
Lc +Hc
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=
(Kc)1−β ·
h
(NLL
c)1/2 + (NHZH
c)1/2
i2β
Lc +Hc
, (22)
where the level of NL is set to normalize yˆUSAZ = 1.
17 In our baseline parameterization, we
treat the United States as the North, and set NH/NL = ZHUS/LUS (see equation (16)).
We use diﬀerences in schooling in 1985 from the Barro-Lee data set to capture dif-
ferences in the supply of skilled workers across countries.18 To reduce the sensitivity of
our results to measurement error and arbitrary choice involved in breaking the population
into two skill groups, we construct four diﬀerent measures for H/L from this data set.
The first is the ratio of the population over 25 with at least primary school attainment to
those over 25 with no primary school attainment. The second is the ratio of those with
secondary school attainment to those without. The third uses secondary completion in-
stead, and the fourth uses college attendance. Secondary schooling or college attendance
better approximate diﬀerences between skilled and unskilled workers emphasized in our
model. Nevertheless, to obtain a highly conservative estimate of the diﬀerences in the
supply of skilled workers between the North and the South, we also look at primary school
attainment, which minimizes the cross-country variability in skills.
We use output per worker and capital per worker for 1988 calculated from the
Summers-Heston data set.19 Finally, we need to determine the parameter, Z, relative
productivity of skilled workers. In our model this is the skill premium in the North (see
Section II.C). In the United States, the mean earnings of workers with high school attain-
ment (10th grade) or more divided by the mean earnings of workers with no high school
attainment (9th grade or less) is over 2, while the mean earnings of full time workers with
some college or more divided by the mean earnings of full time workers with no college is
approximately 1.75 (all numbers calculated from Current Population Survey of the United
States [1996]). We use Z = 1.8 as an upper bound of the relative productivity of skilled
17To obtain the second line of (22), use (i) the equilibrium condition that the price of capital is equal
to its marginal product, i.e.,
δc
δUS
=
Ã £
(NLL
c)1/2 + (NHZH
c)1/2
¤2£
(NLLUS)1/2 + (NHZHUS)1/2
¤2 KUSKc
!1−β
,
(ii) the fact that δUS = 1, and (iii) the normalization of NL that
KUS/
£
(NLLUS)1/2 + (NHZHUS)1/2
¤2
= 1.
18Web address for Barro-Lee data http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg/grthweb/ddbarle2.htm, see
also Barro and Lee [1993]. We also repeated the same exercise using schooling data for 1990, which may
be less appropriate since output and capital data are for 1988. The results were very similar. We
have also experimented with other measures of skills that use average years of schooling rather than the
fraction of the population with various degrees. The results were once again very similar.
19These are as constructed by Hall and Jones [1999], with a correction for the contribution of the
mining sector. Descriptive statistics for this sample were given in Table A1 of our working paper version,
Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1999], and to save space, we do not report those here.
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workers. We also use Z = 1.5, which we view as a more reasonable estimate of the relative
productivity of “skilled” workers, especially when we use secondary school attainment.
In fact, the average earnings of those with high school attainment and completion to those
with no high school (less than 9th grade) in the United States is approximately 1.5.20
Our main results are reported in Table 4. The first three columns refer to the neoclas-
sical model, while columns 4-6 refer to our model using the United States as the North.
Rows refer to diﬀerent measures of skill supply and to diﬀerent values of the parameter
Z. We report three statistics for each experiment, yˆLDC, yˆ5th− and <2s. yˆLDC denotes
the average GDP per worker relative to the United States among the “LDCs” (the 79
poorest countries in the sample), and yˆ5th− denotes output per worker relative to the
United States in the 5th poorest country in the sample. <2s, “constrained R2”, is a more
general measure of goodness of fit. In particular, let yc denote output per worker from
the data and s ∈ {NC,AZ}, then we define <2s = 1−
P
c (y
c − ycs)2 /
P
(yc)2. This is the
“R2” from a regression of output per worker in the data on predicted values when we
constrain the slope to be equal to 1 and the constant to be 0. <2 would be equal to 1, if
there were a perfect fit between the model and the data, though this measure could also
be negative if the fit were particularly bad.
The average output per worker among the LDCs in the sample is about 19 percent
of the United States, and output per worker in the fifth poorest country is about 1/30th
of the U.S. level. The neoclassical model predicts average output among the LDCs to be
between 40 percent and 50 percent, and output per worker in the fifth poorest country
to be between 1/5th and 1/7th of the U.S. level. Like the neoclassical model, our model
underestimates the productivity gap between rich and poor countries, but much less so.
When the skill endowment is measured by secondary school attainment or completion, our
model predicts output per worker diﬀerences quite similar to those which we observe in the
data. For example, with secondary school attainment and Z = 1.5, we obtain yˆLDCAZ = 0.28
and yˆ5th−AZ = 0.05. In contrast, with the same parameter values, the neoclassical model
implies yˆLDCNC = 0.41 and yˆ
5th−
NC = 0.16.
21 Using other measures of relative skill supply and
other values of Z yield similar results, consistently better with directed technical change
than with the neoclassical model.
20Results with values of Z less than 1.5 give also very similar results.
21Expressed alternatively, to explain the cross-country variations with Z = 1.5 and secondary school
attainment as the measure of skills, the neoclassical model needs TFP,Q in equation (21), to be 54 percent
lower in the LDCs than in the U.S. (recall that output in the LDC is on average 19 percent of that in
the U.S., and the neoclassical model predicts it to be 41 percent of the U.S.; 0.54 = 1− (0.19/0.41)). In
contrast, for our model to explain the data, we would need the LDCs to have 30 percent lower TFP than
the U.S. for other reasons (0.30 = 1− (0.19/0.27)). Roughly speaking, therefore, this exercise suggests
that our mechanism can account for one-third to a half of the TFP gap between the U.S. and the LDCs
(see also footnote 15).
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The neoclassical model also appears to perform reasonably well when we look at
the constrained R2 measure. This is because diﬀerences in physical and human capital
are important determinants of output per worker. For example, using secondary school
attainment and Z = 1.5, we obtain<2NC = 0.74, though the fit is lower with the alternative
measures. Incorporating the fact that technologies are not appropriate to the LDCs’ needs
improves the fit substantially; with secondary school measure, Z = 1.5 and the United
States as the North, the constrained R2 rises to <2AZ = 0.93.22
Figures 4 and 5 plot output per worker, yc, and the predicted values from the two
models, yˆcNC and yˆ
c
AZ . They show, once again, that our mechanism contributes signif-
icantly to diﬀerences in output per worker (recall that yUS = yˆUSNC = yˆ
c
AZ = 1). The
neoclassical model systematically underpredicts the diﬀerences in output per worker be-
tween the United States and the LDCs; in Figure 4 almost all points are above the 450
line. In contrast, our model predicts diﬀerences in line with those in the data, and in
Figure 5, the cloud of points shifts towards the 450 line. We therefore conclude that the
mismatch between the technologies developed in the North and the skills of the LDCs
could be an important factor in explaining the large diﬀerences in output per worker and
income per capita across countries.
Although we believe that new technologies being directed at the U.S. market is a good
approximation, it may exaggerate inappropriateness of new technologies to the LDCs’
needs. For this reason, we also report results using countries with a GDP per worker
higher than $20,000 in 1988 as the target of new technologies (see Table 5, columns
1-3). More precisely, we set NH/NL = Z
³
H/L
´
rich
, where
³
H/L
´
rich
is a weighted
average of the number of skilled and unskilled workers in the rich countries using capital
stocks as weights (as implied by our model). In this case too, our model performs
substantially better than the neoclassical model. For example, with technical change
directed at an average rich economy’s needs, Z = 1.5 and secondary school attainment,
we obtain yˆLDCAZ = 0.31 and yˆ
5th−
AZ = 0.07 as compared to yˆ
LDC
NC = 0.41, yˆ
5th−
NC = 0.16 for the
neoclassical model. These results are only slightly worse than the results when technical
change was directed at the United States alone.
Finally, to assess the importance of directed technical change in these results, we
calculate the predictions of the model in the case where technologies are directed at the
average LDC (GDP per worker below $20,000 in 1990 U.S. Dollars) rather than for the
United States or the rich economies. For this purpose, we choose NH/NL = Z
³
H/L
´
LDC
,
22The quantitative results are clearly sensitive to some of the assumptions embedded in in our model.
For example, our model implies that the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is
equal to 2. Modifying the production function, equation (2), and the preferences, equation (1), changes
this elasticity of substitution, and aﬀects the fit of the model. In all cases, however, our model performs
better than the neoclassical alternative.
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where
³
H/L
´
LDC
is the average skill endowment of the 79 poorest countries in the sample.
The results are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 5. With skills measured by secondary
school attainment and Z = 1.5, for instance, we obtain that the average output per
worker in the LDCs would be 46 percent of the U.S. level instead of 28 percent predicted
by our model when the North is taken to be the United States. Furthermore, <2 = 0.57,
instead of <2 = 0.93 as was the case when technical change is directed to the United
States. Directed technical change is also very important when we use the higher education
attainment measure, though substantially less so when skills are measured by primary
education attainment.23 Interestingly, not only does the model with technical change
directed towards the LDCs performs worse than our benchmark, but it performs typically
worse than the neoclassical model (see columns 1-3 of Table 4). These results therefore
demonstrate that directed technical change, towards North’s needs, is central for our
results.
IV. Extensions
In this section, we briefly discuss a number of extensions to our basic framework.
The working paper version of the paper, Acemoglu and Zilibotti [1999], provides a more
detailed analysis of these issues.
First, it is straightforward to generalize the model to include international trade. The
main result of this exercise is that international trade leads to productivity convergence,
but causes divergence in output per worker.
To see this, briefly consider a world where all commodities i ∈ [0, 1] are traded
internationally, and assume δs = 1 for simplicity. Because patents are not enforced
internationally, the balanced growth equilibrium condition, (15), is unchanged; Northern
R&D firms continue to consider Hn and Ln as their markets. Thus, (world) prices, P TH
and P TL , have to adjust to satisfy (15). This implies that in the BGP, world relative
prices will only depend on the factor endowment of the North: P TH/P
T
L = (ZH
n/Ln)−β.
Next, notice that with international trade, commodity prices are equalized in all countries.
Since diﬀerent commodities can be produced by skilled or unskilled workers only, factor
price equalization is always guaranteed. As a result, countries will now adopt the same
technology (same threshold JT ). More specifically,
P TH
P TL
=
Ã
JT
1− JT
!β
=
Ã
NTH
NTL
ZHw
Lw
!−β/2
, (23)
23This is because even in the LDC sample average primary school attainment is quite high, while there
are a number of countries with very low attainment. If, instead of looking at technical change directed at
the average LDC, we consider technical change directed at the median LDC, the results are very diﬀerent
from the case where innovations are directed at the rich economies.
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where Lw = Ls + Ln and Hw = Hs + Hn are the world supplies. Combining (23) with
(15), we obtain the equilibrium relative skill-bias of world technology as
NTH
NTL
=
µ
ZHn
Ln
¶1/2 "Hn
Ln
µ
Hw
Lw
¶−1#1/2
. (24)
NTH/N
T
L is larger than the closed economy ratio, since (H
n/Ln) > (Hw/Lw). Intuitively,
this is because the integrated world economy is more skill-scarce than the North alone.
This result implies that trade induces skill-biased technical change.24 More specifically,
the direction of technical change depends on the relative market sizes, H/L, and relative
prices, PH/PL (recall πL and πH above). Market sizes for technologies do not change,
because inventors continue to sell their machines in the North only. But trade, at first,
increases the relative price of skill intensive goods (see equation (23) at a given NH/NL).
This makes skill-complementary innovations more profitable and accelerates the creation
of skill-complementary machines. Since technologies are now more skill-biased, skilled
workers have higher relative productivities and wages compared to their Southern coun-
terparts. Trade therefore unambiguously amplifies income diﬀerences between the South
and the North. As we saw above, trade induces new technologies to be further biased
towards skilled workers. This reduces the productivity of unskilled workers both in the
South and the North, and because the South is more abundant in unskilled workers, its
relative income with respect to the North deteriorates after this change.
Despite causing divergence in output per worker, trade also leads to convergence in
output per eﬃciency unit of labor and in TFP. The diﬀerence between these two sets
of results is due to changes in factor prices caused by trade. In fact, not only do TFP
diﬀerences decrease, but they actually disappear. The reason for TFP equalization is
factor price equalization. TFP is low in the South when unskilled workers perform tasks
for which they have little comparative advantage. Commodity trade, however, ensures
factor price equalization and induces firms in the South to employ unskilled workers only
in the tasks performed by unskilled workers in the North. Since the productivity of
unskilled workers in these sectors is the same in the North and the South, and likewise for
skilled workers, TFP diﬀerences disappear. Naturally, in the absence of full factor price
equalization, there will continue to be TFP diﬀerences between the North and the South
(see Acemoglu and Zilibotti, [1999])
Second, our assumption of no property rights in the South is clearly unrealistic.
Although the intellectual property rights of Northern companies may be less vigorously
protected in the South than in North, they still receive royalties and enter into joint
24This possibility was first raised by Wood [1994], though without providing a mechanism for it.
Acemoglu [1998] and [1999] demonstrate that trade can induce skill-biased technical change in a related
model.
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partnerships with local firms. It is therefore instructive to investigate how our results
change when property rights are enforced in the South.
A number of important conclusions follow from this analysis. The presence of prop-
erty rights in the South induces the North to develop technologies that are more appro-
priate to the South’s needs (as also pointed out by Diwan and Rodrik [1991]). There
is no guarantee, however, that even with full enforcement of intellectual property rights,
equilibrium technologies will be equally appropriate to the South’s needs as the North’s
needs. This will depend on whether the South or the North is a more important market
for new technologies. Although, in practice, the South is more populous, what matters
is how much producers are willing to pay for new technologies, which in our model is
determined by the relative price of capital, δ. For example, if δ is high in the South due
to distortions, the relative price of capital goods in the South will be substantially higher
than in the North and selling machines to the Northern market will be more profitable.
In this case, our qualitative results continue to hold. In practice, there are also a number
of other reasons for why the market for new technologies may be larger in the North,
including smaller markets for new goods in the LDCs, credit market problems, or general
delays in the adaptation of new technologies to the conditions in the South.
Why would Southern countries not enforce intellectual property rights? First of
all, even though Southern countries benefit from more appropriate technologies, when
property rights are enforced, they will also have to pay higher prices. So it is not clear
whether they would benefit on the whole. More interestingly, even if the South would
benefit overall from the enforcement of intellectual property rights, there is a prisoner’s
dilemma among Southern countries. Each country prefers others to enforce property
rights to encourage Northern producers to develop technologies appropriate to the South’s
needs overall, but it will not have an incentive to enforce these property rights itself.
This suggests that there may be a role for international organizations in coordinating the
enforcement of intellectual property rights or in encouraging the production of technologies
appropriate to the conditions in the South.
Finally, we have assumed throughout that all industries always use the frontier tech-
nology. Many of our examples suggest, however, that producers in the LDCs often prefer
to use backward technologies when frontier technologies are not appropriate to their skill
base. It is straightforward to incorporate this possibility into our set up by allowing less
skill intensive local technologies to be used simultaneously. In the previous version of the
paper, we showed that as long as these local technologies improve less rapidly than the
frontier technology, which seems reasonable, skill-scarce countries may use local technolo-
gies at first, but eventually, all local technologies will be abandoned. During this process
of switching from local to frontier technologies, there will be faster convergence between
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the South and the North.
V. Conclusion
Existing explanations for productivity diﬀerences across countries emphasize barriers
to technology transfer (e.g., Parente and Prescott [1994]). In contrast, we have pro-
posed a model where productivity diﬀerences between the less developed and advanced
economies arise even in the absence of such barriers. The North has more skilled workers,
and employs them in tasks performed by unskilled workers in the South. Furthermore,
we made two crucial, but plausible, assumptions: most new technologies are developed in
the North, and technical change is directed, in the sense that more profitable technologies
get developed and upgraded faster. The larger supply of skills in the North implies that
new technologies are relatively skill-complementary, whereas the South, which employs
unskilled workers in most tasks and sectors, needs more labor-complementary technolo-
gies. This mismatch between the skills of the South and technologies imported from the
North is the source of the productivity diﬀerences, and amplifies the diﬀerences in output
per worker.
Our calculations indicate that this technology-skill mismatch may be an important
factor in explaining the cross-country income diﬀerences. Encouraging the development
of technologies more appropriate to the LDCs could therefore reduce the output gap. In
fact, a number of international organizations are already active in developing technologies
useful to the LDCs. An investigation of the empirical importance of this mechanism
and the benefits of investing further in technologies appropriate for the LDCs, either by
international organizations or by private R&D firms, may be a fruitful area for further
study.
Our model also suggests that if the tendency towards more skill-bias technologies in
the United States and other OECD economies, documented among others by Berman,
Bound and Machin [1998], continues, income diﬀerences across countries may increase.
This is because richer countries will benefit more from the more skill-biased technologies
than the relatively skills-scarce LDCs. Raising the supply of skilled workers in the LDCs
would be a natural remedy to counterbalance this tendency.
Finally, technologies developed in the North may be inappropriate not only to the
skills, but to a range of other conditions prevailing in the South. Climate, tastes, cul-
tures and institutions aﬀect the relative productivities of diﬀerent technologies. Whether
“appropriateness” in these dimensions is equally important as the mismatch between
technologies and skills is mostly an empirical question, and one which we believe deserves
study.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
The Euler equation for individual utility maximization gives C˙ (t) /C (t) = σ−1 ·(r (t)− ρ)
where r (t) is the interest rate at time t. In a BGP, consumption, output and all varieties
of machines grow at the same rate, g = σ−1 · (r − ρ). As discussed in the text, in order for
NH and NL to grow at the same rate, we must have that r = πH/µ = πL/µ. The unique
BGP growth rate (17) immediately follows using the expressions for πL and πH in (14) .
Consider now an economy starting out of the BGP. Assume that (NH/NL)t0 <
ZH/L. We will prove that, in this case, over an interval of time t ∈ [t0, t0 + s] , XH (t) > 0
and XL (t) = 0, or, equivalently, N˙H (t) > 0 and N˙L (t) = 0.
First, notice that free entry implies µ ≥ max [VH , VL]. Moreover, µ > Vz if and only
if Xz = 0 (and, consequently, N˙z = 0). In order for the variety of machines to expand
in both sectors, we would then need to have µ = VH (t) = VL (t) for an interval of time.
Now rewrite (13) as
r(t)Vz(t) = πz(t) + V˙z(t).
This immediately implies that µ = VH (t) = VL (t) is only possible if V˙H (t) = V˙L (t) = 0.
This, in turn, would require πH (t) = πL (t) over the same interval of time. However,
(NH/NL)t0 < ZH/L immediately implies that (P
n
H/P
n
L )t0 > (ZH
n/Ln)−β, and, πH (t0) >
πL (t0). So µ = VH (t) = VL (t) for t ∈ [t0, t0 + s] is impossible given (NH/NL)t <
ZHn/Ln.
Therefore, as long as (NH/NL)t < ZH
n/Ln, we have µ = VH (t) = πH (t) /r (t) and
µ > VL (t). So N˙H (t) > 0 and N˙L (t) = 0. Thus, the economy monotonically approaches
the BGP, and arrives there in finite time. The argument to show that an economy starting
from (NH/NL)t > ZH
n/Ln converges to the BGP is identical. QED
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VI. Appendix B: Data
A. Nonproduction Workers, Output and Capital Stock Data
The U.N. General Industrial Statistics dataset contains information on the employ-
ment of production (operative) and nonproduction workers. We construct the nonproduc-
tion workers’ employment share as the number of nonproduction workers divided by total
employment.
The data on value added and investment are in local prices. Value added data are
converted to 1990 U.S. dollars using the purchasing power parity (PPP) for GDP, and
investment data are converted to the U.S. dollars using the PPP for investment.
We construct the capital stock data from the investment data using standard depre-
ciation formulae. Our sample is limited to countries with information on nonproduction
workers and investment, but we dropped Hungry and Poland to focus on non-communist
countries (the inclusion of these two countries does not change the results), Germany and
Hong Kong because of diﬀerences in industry classification, and finally Bolivia because
problems with investment data.25 This left us with a sample of 22 counties, consisting of
Australia, Austria, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Korea,
Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, USA, Columbia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Turkey and Venezuela.
A potential problem with the investment data is that there are missing values, and
observations start in diﬀerent years for diﬀerent industries and countries. We deal with
this problem by interpolating the investment series for the missing years after the starting
year of that industry-country pair. This gives us an investment series {Ic,i,t} for each
country, c, and industry, i, starting at some date t = Tc,i. From the series, we construct
the capital stock for 1990 as follows.
We start with the standard capital accumulation equation
Kc,i,t =
tX
s=−∞
(1− d)t−sIc,i,s, (25)
where d is the depreciation rate and, here, t = 1990 (or, if this is missing, the most recent
observation available). Equation (25) can be rewritten as
Kc,i,t =
bIc,i,t
d
where bIc,i,t ≡ Pts=−∞(1− d)t−sIc,i,sPt
s=−∞(1− d)t−s
(26)
25Investment output ratio is extremely high for Bolivia, so the implied capital output ratios are greater
than 1,000, indicating that the data for this country are not reliable.
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is a weighted average investment flow, calculated using depreciation rates as weights.
Now suppose that we do not have investment data before time Tc,i for this particular
country-industry pair. Then, we calculate a weighted average investment flow analogous
to (26) as
bITc,i,t =
Pt
s=Tc,i
(1− d)t−sIc,i,sPt
s=Tc,i
(1− d)t−s ,
We can finally construct an estimated capital stock as Ket where
Ket =
bITc,i,t
d
.
We calculated our capital stock data using this procedure with a depreciation rate of
d = 0.08. We checked the robustness of the results to other depreciation rates, including
depreciation rates of 0.10, 0.05 and also no depreciation over the sample period; the results
were very similar.
B. Construction of the TFP Series
Chain-weighted TFP, TFPCW , is calculated as follows. Let n ∈ {1, 2, ..., 24} denote
country ranks in terms of industry i’s capital-labor ratio. Let also x [ni] denote the value
of variable x for the country ranked as n-th in industry i. We calculate the “cross-country
growth rate” of value added per worker (yl), capital per worker (kl) and eﬃciency units
of labor per worker (el) as
d log (x [ni]) = log x[ni]− log x[ni − 1]
for ni > 1. We then calculate chain weighted labor share as
s˜ [ni] =
s¯ [ni]
2
− s¯ [ni − 1]
2
for ni > 1, where s¯ is the share of labor (in value added) calculated as total wage bill
divided by value added. Then,
d log (TFP [ni]) = d log
³
yl [ni]
´
− (1− s˜ [ni]) · d log
³
kl [ni]
´
− s˜ [ni] · d log
³
el [ni]
´
.
We obtain TFPCWic by setting the United States as the numeraire in each industry. See
also Hall and Jones [1999] for the use of this methodology to calculate cross-country
aggregate TFPs.
Cobb-Douglas TFP, TFPCW , is calculated using a similar formula
d log (TFP [ni]) = d log
³
yl [ni]
´
− (1− si) · d log
³
kl [ni]
´
− si · d log
³
el [ni]
´
,
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where si is the average share labor income across all countries in industry i.
Overall, we have data on the following sectors: furniture, clothes, rubber, wood,
leather, pottery, shoes, textile, glass, iron, tobacco, metal, plastic, other mineral, paper,
other manufacturing, food, fabricated metals, beverages, printing, machinery, electrical
machines, scientific equipment, chemical, other chemical, miscellaneous petroleum prod-
ucts, and petroleum. Productivity in the petroleum industry is unlikely to be related to
the factors discussed in this paper. When included, this industry is a massive outlier,
but actually strengthens our results. To err on the conservative side, we dropped this
industry from the analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
low skill medium skill high skill
rich poor rich poor rich poor
value added 36,951 4,563 66,272 6,722 78,374 9,530
per worker (15,152) (4,813) (36,778) (7,489) (33,984) (10,376)
capital 25,027 14,227 56,687 24,561 55,814 27,694
per worker (17,450) (13,012) (54,901) (31,814) (39,599) (23,439)
nonprod 0.26 0.14 0.33 0.21 0.41 0 .29
per worker (0.18) (0.04) (0.15) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
TFPCW 1.01 0.22 1.02 0.27 1.04 0.30
(0.28) (0.11) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
TFPCD 1.01 0.22 1.02 0.26 1.03 0.30
(0.26) (0.11) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
TFPR 1.32 0.34 1.25 0.49 1.21 0.64
(0.75) (0.24) (0.37) (0.35) (0.41) (0.52)
Notes: Low-skill industries are furniture, clothes, rubber, wood, leather, pottery, shoes, textile and
glass. Medium-skill industries are iron, tobacco, metal, plastic, other mineral, paper, other manufacturing,
food and fabricated metals. High-skill industries are beverages, printing, machinery, electrical machines,
scientific equipment, chemical, other chemical and miscellaneous petroleum products. The rich countries
are those with GDP per capita greater than $6,500 in 1988. These are Australia, Austria, Canada,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom and USA.
The LDCs are Columbia, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Turkey and Venezuela. non-
prod is nonproduction workers divided by total employment. Value added and capital data are in 1990
U.S. dollars. The first three rows give averages weighted by employment. TFPCW , TFPCD, and TFPR
are the three alternative measures of sectoral total factor productivity (relative to the U.S.), and the
averages are weighted by value added. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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Table 3: Variations
Dep. var.→ TFPCW TFPCD TFPR weight by North incl. India
Indep. var.↓
pn_North 0.24 0.28 0.63 val. added US yes
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16)
pn_North 0.36 0.38 0.75 val. added US no
(0.13) (0.13) (0.21)
pn_North 0.32 0.36 0.54 val. added G3 yes
(0.14) (0.14) (0.23)
pn_North 0.23 0.26 0.60 val. added US yes
(0.12) (0.12) (0.17) rel to co avg
pn_North 0.27 0.30 0.65 val. added US no
(0.12) (0.13) (0.19) rel to co avg
pn_North 0.30 0.34 0.52 val. added G3 yes
(0.14) (0.14) (0.24) rel to co avg
pn_North 0.07 0.11 0.34 empl. US yes
(0.10) (0.10) (0.16)
pn_North 0.29 0.31 0.53 empl. US no
(0.12) (0.12) (0.26)
pn_North 0.13 0.19 0.18 empl. G3 yes
(0.13) (0.13) (0.24)
rank_North 0.12 0.13 0.26 val. added US yes
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
rank_North 0.18 0.19 0.33 val. added US no
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
rank 0.15 0.17 0.24 val. added G3 yes
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
Notes: Dependent variable is log of TFP relative to the U.S. calculated in various ways (TFPCWic , TFP
CD
ic
and TFPRic). The regressors are pn_North, log proportion of non-production workers in the U.S. or the
G3 (the U.S., the United Kingdom and Canada), or rank, (log) rank of the industries according to
pn_North. All regressions include country eﬀects, and standard errors corrected for clustering are in
parenthes.
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Table 4: The neoclassical model vs. directed technical change
Neoclassical model Our model(North=US)
H/L Z yˆLDCNC yˆ
5th−
NC <2NC yˆLDCAZ yˆ5th−AZ <2AZ
Primary 1.5 0.46 0.19 0.44 0.40 0.10 0.57
Sec. att. 1.5 0.41 0.16 0.76 0.27 0.05 0.93
Sec. compl. 1.5 0.41 0.17 0.74 0.30 0.08 0.92
Higher 1.5 0.45 0.19 0.67 0.38 0.14 0.80
Primary 1.8 0.48 0.18 0.48 0.42 0.10 0.58
Sec. att. 1.8 0.38 0.15 0.82 0.25 0.05 0.94
Sec. compl. 1.8 0.39 0.15 0.81 0.28 0.07 0.93
Higher 1.8 0.43 0.18 0.72 0.36 0.13 0.84
Notes: yˆLDC is the predicted (unweighted) average GDP per worker in 1988 in LDCs. LDCs are all
countries with a Summers-Heston GDP per worker in 1988 below $20,000. yˆ5th− is the predicted GDP
per worker of the 5th poorest country in the sample. In the data, yLDC = 0.19 and y5th− = 0.03. H/L
is the relevant ratio of skilled to unskilled workers, and Z is the skill-premium.
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Table 5. Importance of directed technical change
TC directed to avg. “DC” TC directed to avg. “LDC”
H/L Z yˆLDCAZ yˆ
5th−
AZ <2AZ yˆLDCAZ yˆ5th−AZ <2AZ
Primary 1.5 0.43 0.10 0.58 0.45 0.11 0.54
Sec. att. 1.5 0.31 0.07 0.90 0.46 0.15 0.58
Sec. compl. 1.5 0.36 0.11 0.85 0.49 0.18 0.50
Higher 1.5 0.43 0.16 0.72 0.49 0.20 0.52
Primary 1.8 0.43 0.10 0.58 0.44 0.10 0.55
Sec. att. 1.8 0.29 0.06 0.92 0.42 0.13 0.69
Sec. compl. 1.8 0.33 0.10 0.89 0.46 0.16 0.62
Higher 1.8 0.41 0.15 0.77 0.48 0.19 0.58
Notes: Calculations are as in columns 4-6 of Table 4, but with diﬀerent NH/NL’s. In columns 1-3, we use
NH/NL = ZH¯/L¯ , where H¯/L¯ = (Σ24c=1K
c/K¯rich) ∗ (Hc/Lc) is the weighted average skill endowment
(weighted by total capital) of the 24 richest countries (GDP per worker in 1988 higher than $20,000).
These are the U.S., Canada, Switzerland, Australia, Kuwait, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, West
Germany, France, Sweden, United Kingdom, Finland, New Zealand, Iceland, Austria , Denmark, Spain,
Israel, Hong Kong, Singapore, Trinidad, Japan and Ireland. In columns 4-6, we use NH/NL = ZH¯/L¯,
where H¯/L¯ = (Σ24c=1K
c/K¯rich) ∗ (Hc/Lc) is the weighted average skill endowment (weighted by total
capital) of the 79 poorest countries (GDP per worker in 1988 smaller than $20,000).
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Figure 1: Sectoral TFP Patterns in the North (an) and the South (asL, a
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Figure 3. TFP gap across 27 industries in selected LDCs
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Output per worker: predictions of neoclassical model vs. data
Secondary school attainment (Z=1.5).
P
re
d
ic
te
d
 o
u
tp
u
t 
p
e
r 
w
o
rk
e
r
Output per worker (Summers Heston data)
0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
.7
.8
.9
1
Figure 4: Output per worker: ycNC vs. y
c.
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Output per worker: predictions of our model vs. data
Secondary school attainment (Z=1.5).
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Figure 5: Output per worker: ycAZ vs. y
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